When everyone can find your vulnerabilities

Medical Devices after AI

You get one shot at the premarket evidence, then a postmarket loop that never stops.

Jason Sinchak · ELTON · Health-ISAC webinar

TODAY'S PANEL

Introductions.

Four seats at the same problem: the sector, a manufacturer, an engineer, and the people testing the products.

Jason Sinchak
CEO
ELTON
AI medical device testing

Phil Englert
VP, Medical Device Security
Health-ISAC
The sector view across members

Oleg Yusim
VP, Product Security
Illumina
Product security from the inside

Shehadeh Dajani
Software Engineer
TripleRing
Building innovative devices

THE SHAPE OF IT

One shot at the evidence and a loop that never stops.

Both get called AI security. They arrive at different times, on different evidence, and they fail in different ways.

01

PREMARKET · PART ONE

AI inside the device

The model is trained off-device, and so is most of the evidence. One submission, one chance to capture it.

The model ships without the pipeline that made it.

Roughly 1,500 AI-enabled devices are on FDA's list. Almost every submission scoped cyber to the box on the right.

~1,500
AI-enabled devices on FDA's list

295
AI/ML 510(k) clearances in 2025

1 of 7
FDA threat categories a pentest covers

FDA DRAFT, SECTION XII

PREMARKET

FDA named seven AI threats your testing one.

Section XII of the January 2025 draft. Nineteen months old, still draft, and nobody is talking about it.



6 of 7 live upstream of the thing you tested

FDA draft guidance on AI-enabled device software functions, Section XII, page 34

TIMING

PREMARKET

Cybersecurity starts at model training

You cannot assess poisoning resistance on a frozen model. Those properties were set months earlier.



Standards are coming fast

Five of the six landed in the last twelve months. None are harmonised. All of them still reach you.

AND ADOPTION IS NOT THE TRIGGER

A standard exists

The notified body may cite it

Annex VII 4.5.1 obliges it

You answer it in the file

GSPR 17.2 has said state of the art since 2021

02

POSTMARKET · PART TWO

The vulnerability avalanche

Lap one of the loop. What now arrives against a product that is already in the field.

A ten-year pentester now eighteen dollars an hour.

The unsophisticated attacker just got expert tooling.

Honest caveat: ARTEMIS ran an 82 percent valid rate while four of ten humans hit 100, and Anthropic reported its model overstated findings.

The softest target is the device you already sold.

Legacy units sell on the resale market with no NDA and no scope. Limited incentive by manufacturers to support. Third-party researchers are hitting them with AI at low costs.

Bought secondhand
resale listings, no NDA, no scope

Put on a bench
runtime discovery, not firmware review

Runtime beats firmware analysis on a legacy unit, because the parts nobody documented are the parts still running.

IF YOU OPERATE THESE DEVICES

- **Assume the exposure window is open**
  your manufacturer's fix queue is the constraint
- **Rank compensating controls by chains**
  segmentation outranks a patch you will not get
- **Ask vendors the six questions**
  and ask what happens at end of support

VOLUME

POSTMARKET · CONTINUOUS

Sixty-six thousand CVEs this year, and NVD stopped enriching them.

Discovery got cheap first, the pressure is now on triage.

FIRST revised its 2026 forecast up to roughly 66,000 in June.

1 Mar 2026

NVD enrichment cutoff

Everything published before that date moved to Not Scheduled.

+76%

HackerOne submissions

Year over year. A quarter of it confirmed exploitable.

curl ran the experiment for us

Bounty closed in January under 5 percent valid. Reopened in March with no money, and the valid rate came back to 15 or 16 percent. Roughly 50 curl CVEs expected in 2026.

AI safety reached back for a 2005 security control.

There are good and bad intent behind vulnerability discovery.

A classifier that reads the prompt and decides whether the words look like an attack. That is a blocklist.





Caution: Models have an off switch you do not control.

On 13 June a directive landed at 5:21pm and two frontier models were off for every customer within hours.



13 JUN 2026

Export directive. Fable and Mythos off for every customer in hours.

1 JUL 2026

Restored, gated behind a new classifier a government body signed off on.

ANY TUESDAY

Reasoning effort lowered, context discarded, a quiet quantization.

Treat model access the way you treat a sole-source supplier, and keep the harness portable.

Caution: Quality of Service and Fees.

Building internal AI testing capabilities can have unpredictable costs.



By step five the per-step cost has risen 32 times. By step fifteen it overflows.

$47,000 two agents looping for 11 days with no per-agent ceiling

6 weeks of quality complaints traced to three stacked changes

~60/40 our own split of runs that pay for themselves

The house can change the deck between hands, and the tokens are already spent.

03

POSTMARKET · PART THREE

How AI vulnerability discovery works

The harness, the agent swarm, and what one of these did to a real company in July.

The harness is the product.

When someone says they use AI for vulnerability discovery, ask what their harness looks like. The model is interchangeable.



OpenAI HuggingFace Incident

Two zero-days, one to break out and one to break in, chained autonomously toward a single objective, with no source code.

Seventeen thousand actions with nobody driving.



17,600+	4.5 days	~1 sec	0
automated actions	9 to 13 July 2026	credential to cluster-admin	humans directing it

The agents built their own message board.

Nobody gave them a way to talk to each other. They wrote files into a package registry and used it as a bulletin board.



04

POSTMARKET · PART FOUR

How management of AI vulns works

Why volume is not a result, and why exploitability is a separate activity from discovery.

Volume is not a good outcome.

These findings are right about the code. Where they go wrong is the path.



These findings are right about the code. Where they go wrong is the path.

CVE rates 9.8 on one device and zero on the next.

Attack vector, complexity, privileges required, user interaction and scope are all statements about your architecture.

One CVE. Two devices. The whole difference lives in the edges.

Ten vulnerabilities closed by one change.

Exploitation usually needs several conditions to line up. Close the root and the conditionals close with it.

Ten tickets became one change. Nobody patched the other nine.

PRIORITY

POSTMARKET · CONTINUOUS

Rank a control by how many chains it kills.

The kiosk lock that blocks forty chains outranks the patch that closes one CVE.

A scanner would have told you to do the bottom one first.

05

POSTMARKET · PART FIVE

Agentic fixing, then round again

Closing the loop. The fix changes the product, and the next release re-opens it.

Discovery went exponential while remediation improved nineteen percent.

Machine-speed finding against week-speed fixing is a widening exposure window, and you cannot out-hire it.



HackerOne, 2026: submissions up 76 percent year over year, remediation up 19 percent.

The identifying agent becomes the spec that fixes it.

Same loop discipline as the finding side, with one thing bolted on the end that software teams do not need.



Fast where it is safe. Gated where a wrong patch is an outage you caused.

HONEST LIMITS

POSTMARKET · CONTINUOUS

Fixing Requires Device Context and Automation.

Fixes generated, fixes correct, fixes merged without human edit. Audited. Nobody has published it.

HOW MUCH OF THIS IS ACTUALLY EVIDENCED



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WHERE TO START

Where to start.

Nothing here needs a budget cycle. Half of it is a question you can ask your own team this week.

PREMARKET, THIS SUBMISSION

- Map test cases to all seven Section XII categories, including the pipeline
- Run the DOUP question: what share of the training corpus has no provenance
- Capture the training-time evidence while the environment still exists

POSTMARKET, EVERY RELEASE

- Point an agentic pipeline at one device on a bench you own, in a closed loop
- Fund exploitability determination as its own activity, separate from discovery
- Put a human and a validation gate in front of anything bound for a fielded device

BOTH PHASES, THIS WEEK

Check what breaks if NVD never enriches another CVE, and ask any AI vendor for an audited fix-correct rate.