If we can't exploit it, we won't call it a vulnerability. ELTON's exploitability verification does not theorize. It demonstrates, through real access to the running device, and evidences the result for regulatory review. Physical device or software-only (SaMD), the bar is the same: proof against the running product.
Threat models predict. Human pentests vary with the tester and the week. ELTON verification is cold fact: exploited on the running device, evidenced, and traced back to your own documentation.
The twin’s components, interfaces, data flows, and assets are threat modeled with MITRE EMB3D: component types map to properties (PIDs), properties map to threats (TIDs), and ELTON extends both where EMB3D stops. Every threat pins to a component, test cases generate against exactly that scope, and the same machinery validates a new vulnerability the day it appears.
Reachable from the real attack surface and substantiated by a test case generated and executed against the target. Real. Worth a developer's time.
Worth tracking, not worth interrupting a release for. It does not flood the backlog as if it were urgent, and it ships dismissed with its reasoning.
Every tier adds evidentiary weight. Developers only see what survives, and each dismissal is backed by the tier that cleared it.
Reachability and control analysis against the twin removes findings that have no path before anyone touches the device.
Static and dynamic analysis of the actual code and firmware confirms or kills the finding at the binary level.
On-device exploitation through TestLink™. The strongest evidence there is: an executed test case, pass or fail.
A finding is not closed by opinion. Every test case comes from the device’s own threat model, runs at the deepest tier you open, and lands as evidence: an unbroken chain from CVE to determination that reviewers can follow. Deeper access closes more findings as Not Affected, and every VEX statement gets stronger.
Autonomous agents probe every attack surface with human-like reasoning. Findings are only accepted when exploitability is confirmed through controlled, non-destructive validation. Every verified finding leaves a traceable artifact: test case, execution log, result, and VEX status. If it can't be proven, it doesn't ship.
Start with one device. We build the twin from documentation your quality system already produces, run AI discovery remotely, and show you the graph: the handful to fix, and the evidence for everything else.
Exploitability verification is a proof, not a rating. ELTON does not theorize that a finding is exploitable, it demonstrates it through real access to the running device and evidences the result for regulatory review. If it cannot be exploited, ELTON will not call it a vulnerability. The bar is the same for a physical device or software only (SaMD).
A vulnerability is exploitable today: reachable from the real attack surface and substantiated by a test case generated and executed against the target. A weakness is latent. It is worth tracking, not worth interrupting a release for, and it ships dismissed with its reasoning instead of flooding the backlog as if it were urgent.
Test cases fall out of the threat model, not out of a library. The twin's components, interfaces, data flows and assets are threat modeled with MITRE EMB3D: component types map to properties, properties map to threats, and ELTON extends both where EMB3D stops. Every threat pins to a component, so test cases generate against exactly that scope.
L1 is reachability and control analysis against the digital twin, which removes roughly 30 to 40 percent of findings as Not Affected before anyone touches the device. L2 is static and dynamic analysis of the actual code and firmware, roughly 50 to 65 percent. L3 is on-device exploitation through TestLink, roughly 70 to 85 percent.
Every tier adds evidentiary weight, and a dismissal is only as strong as the tier that cleared it. L3 is the strongest evidence there is, an executed test case with a pass or fail on real hardware. Deeper access closes more findings and makes every VEX statement stronger, with the chain from CVE to determination unbroken.